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FIRST AMNIL)MENT
May
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the Government Exclude "Nontraditional"
a Federally-Sponsored Charity Drive?
Charities
byjoel N!. Gora
Donald J. Devine, Director,
Office of Personnel Management
V.
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
(Docket No. 84-312)
Argued February 19, 1985
This case directly pits the Reagan administration
against several liberal organizations in a controversy
with real dollars and cents consequences. For a quarter
of a century, the federal government has sponsored the
Combined Federal Campaign (CFC), which allows a
wide variety of private charities that promote "health
and welfare" to solicit contributions from federal civilian
employees and military personnel in the federal work-
place. Last year, the CFC raised over $100 million for
the designated charities. Participation in the CFC is the
exclusive method for soliciting contributions from fed-
eral employees at work.
In 1980, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund and other public interest groups petitioned the
federal government to be included in the annual CFC
drive as organizations to which federal workers could
make contributions. These legal advocacy groups are all
recognized as nonprofit charitable entities under the tax
laws. After an initial rejection of their request (a ruling
later overturned by a court on procedural grounds)
various legal defense funds and public interest groups
were admitted to the campaign and participated for two
years as designated charities.
In February, 1983, however, a Presidential Executive
Order announced that: "Agencies that seek to influence
the outcomes of elections or the determinations of pub-
lic policy through political activity or advocacy, lobbying,
or litigation on behalf of' parties other than themselves
shall not be deemed charitable health and welfare agen-
cies and shall not be eligible to participate in the Coin-
bined Federal Campaign.
The excluded groups filed suit to challenge their
expulsion from the CFC. Two lower courts (504t F.
Supp. 1365 (1).D.C. 1981) and 560 F. Supp. 667 (D.D.C.
1983)), agreed that removing them from the charity
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drive was unconstitutional under the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of' speech, ruling that the govern-
ment had no valid reason to permit other charities to
solicit contributions, while barring the legal rights or-
ganizations.
ISSUE
The case now before the Supreme Court, Devine v.
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, involves the government's
appeal fi'om those rulings. The issue is whether exclud-
ing the advocacy groups from participating in the Com-
bined Federal Campaign, on the ground that they are
not "traditional" charities, violates the First Amend-
ment.
FACTS
In 1961, to control and simplify the process of char-
itable solicitation in the federal workplace, President
Kennedy created the CFC. Ad hoc, sporadic solicitation
would be replaced by a single, annual drive, supervised
by federal employees-through which "national volun-
tary health and welfare agencies and such other national
voluntary agencies as may be "appropriate" would be
allowed to solicit funds from federal workers at their
places of employment or duty stations. Direct onsite
solicitations would be prohibited and replaced by parti-
cipation in the CFC, which would be open to "nonprofit
tax-exempt agencies having specific functions in the
fields of health, welfare or recreational services" with an
active and efficient program directed at the welfare of
the public and the persons served.
The campaign, as it developed over the next two
decades, is under the supervision of the Director of the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Apart from
this national supervision, the fundraising drives are con-
ducted locally at federal installations-usually through
the joint operation of it local private voluntary organiza-
tion (the "Principal Combined Fund Organization" or
PCFO) overseen by a local federal coordinating commit-
tee. The local PCFO's costs are reimbursed from the
funds secured by the participating charities.
Each local campaign consists of a single annual drive
of several weeks in the fall of the year. The participating
federal agencies conduct the solicitation among their
employees using materials supplied by the local PCFO.
Federal workers are encouraged to contribute and vol-
unteer their time to help with the fund drive. Included
in the material provided is a brochure describing all the
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participating charities in brief' statements prepared by
the charities themselves. Employees who choose to con-
tribute to the CFC may either designate one or more of
these charities to receive their contributions or make an
undesignated contribution which the local PCFC will
allocate among the particpating charities as it sees fit.
Importantly, these contributions can be made through
payroll deductions.
In effect, the federal government, through the CFC
provides the structure, mechanism and opportunity for
private charitable organizations to directly solicit contri-
butions from federal workers. Through the OPM, and
local committees, the federal government supervises the
overall program.
Participating in the CFC is a two-step process. First,
the organization must apply to the Office of Personnel
Management for certification of' national eligibility. A
charity that obtains this national clearance is then al-
lowed to apply separately to each of the approximately
550 local campaigns in which it wishes to participate.
In 1980, two civil rights organizations-the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Flud and the P'uerto
Rican Legal )efense and Educational Fund-were de-
nied the right to participate in the CFC on the ground
that they did not provide "direct services," but rather
serve as "advocates flor groups," and were thus ineligible
under the regulations. The two groups brought suit and
a federal district court agreed with their contention that
the CFC is a government-sponsored channel of commu-
nication, exclusion from which must confbrm to First
Amendment safeguards. Since the term "direct services"
was found too vague a criterion to determine eligibility
for participation, the court ordered the organizations
admitted to the campaign.
Instead of appealing this ruling, the government
revised its regulations to permit legal advocacy groups to
participate in the campaign. Accordingly, in 1982 and
1983, in addition to the two challengers, other partici-
pants in the campaign included the Conservative Legal
Defense and Education Fund, the National Right to
Work Legal Defense Foundation, the Center for Auto
Safety and the National Organization for Women Legal
Defense Fund. Although there was some controversy
over including certain of' these groups-particularly
union opposition to the right to work group--the 1983
campaign set a new record for charitable contributions.
The NAACP Fund alone received over $525,000 in
contributions in the two-year period.
But OPM Director Devine clearly bridled at having
these "controversial" groups in the campaign. He
strongly lobbied the White House for authority to expel
such groups, and, in February of 1983, he got it. Presi-
dent Reagan issued the contested Executive Order ex-
cluding legal defense funds from the CFC. A number of
such groups, including the Sierra Club Legal Defense
Fund, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law and the Natural Resources Defense Council,joined
the two civil rights funds in filing suit to challenge their
exclusion. These groups contend that their legal rights
activities do provide "health and welfare" charitable
services to countless people in the form of securing
equal employment rights, educational opportunities,
welfare benefits and environmental protection. They
claim that they fulfill charitable purposes as much as
"legal aid societies," which are not excluded, and more
than groups such as the National Parks and Conserva-
tion Association, the United States Olympic Committee
and the wilderness Society-all of which have been ad-
mitted to the CFC. Accordingly, they maintain, their
exclusion must result either from the fact that their
charitable activities are "controversial" or because their
charitable work takes the form of litigation-neither of
which is permissible basis of exclusion under the First
Amendment. In addition, Planned Parenthood, which
was singled out for special condemnation by Director
Devine, filed separate litigation, which is still pending.
The government, however, argues that the CFC his-
torically has been made available only to "traditional"
charities whose goals are universally considered
"worthwhile," although these terms nowhere appear in
the applicable regulations. In its view, excluding legal
advocacy groups serves these purposes and protects the
viability and success of the CFC by minimizing contro-
versy and disaffection, preventing disruption in the fed-
eral workplace, avoiding the appearance that federal
resources are being used to further partisan causes and
preventing the CFC's from being inundated by a wide
variety of "nontraditional" organizations.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The basic issue for the Court is whether, in setting up
the CFC and allowing charities to use it to solicit contri-
butions, the government has created a forun for com-
munication and expression. If so, the Court must next
determine what kind of a forum has been created and
what standards should govern the propriety of' denying
certain charitable groups access to that forum.
First Amendment "public forumin" law-not untypi-
cally-traces to an 1895 observation by Oliver Wendell
Holmes, then a Massachusetts appellate judge, that "for
the (government) absolutely or conditionally to forbid
speaking in a highway or public park is no more an
infringement of the rights of a member of the public
than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his
home."
The law has come a long way since then. In 1939,
Justice Roberts proclaimed that using streets and parks
for assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens
and discussing public questions has "from ancient times"
been a part of the privileges and liberties of citizens.
Thus originated the concept of "the public forum"-
those places which by long tradition have been devoted
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to assembly and debate. When use of such a traditional
public forum for speech is involved, the government's
power to interfere with the speaker is severely limited.
Only speech which is illegal, such as incitement or por-
nography, can be banned, and the government's ability
to impose reasonable rules for competing uses of the
forum cannot depend on the speaker's message or point
of view.
In this case, there is no claim that the messages of the
legal advocacy groups are in any way illegal or subject to
suppression. In fact, the Court has clearly ruled that
legal advocacy is a protected form of political and social
expression under the First Amendment, and that solici-
tation for charitable contributions is protected as well.
Thus, if the legal defense funds wished to solicit contri-
butions in a traditional public forum, they could not be
prohibited from doing so, as the government concedes.
But the challengers are not content, figuratively speak-
ing, to stand on a street corner and ask for contribu-
tions. Instead, like other advocates before them, the
legal defense groups want to be able to communicate
their messages in the most direct fashion to an appropri-
ate audience. To do so, they need access to places and
methods of communication, such as the CFC, which are
not traditional public forums.
The Court has had to deal with such claims of access
frequently in recent years, determining whether a parti-
cular facility, location or channel of communication
could be closed or restricted to certain groups, indiidu-
als or messages. Such sought-after "forums" have in-
cluded: public libraries, prison and jail property,
schoolgrounds, the advertising spaces on city buses, mu-
nicipally-owned theatres, the open portions of military
bases, a meeting room at a public university, state
fairgrounds, home letter boxes and the internal mail
distribution system of a school district. In these cases,
most particularly the last one, the Court has fashioned a
series of rules to catalog such nontraditional forums and
identify the extent to which government may control use
of them.
The Court has defined a "limited public forum" as
public property which government "has opened for use
by the public as a place for expressive activity." Even
though the government is not obliged to create or con-
tinue such forums and may limit their use to certain
kinds of groups or the discussion of certain kinds of
subjects, so long as the forum already exists, the govern-
ment is sharply restricted in determining who may use
the forum to communicate. Examples include a univer-
sity meeting hall and a schoolboard public hearing.
Fewer restrictions apply to government's allocation of
access to so-called "nonpublic forums," places which are
not by tradition or designation a forum for comnmunica-
tion, but where government has granted speakers access
for certain purposes. In such nonpublic forumns, the
government may pick and choose among speakers and
messages, "as long as the regulation on speech is reason-
able and not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Ex-
amples include a school's interoffice mail system and a
military base.
In the lower court proceedings, there was extensive
debate over whether the CFC should be labeled a limited
public forum-making it harder to justify excluding
legal advocacy groups, or a nonpublic Forum- where
the government only need show its action is reasonable
and not disguised censorship. In the Supreme Court,
however, both sides seem to concede that the CFC is
probably a nonpublic forum, rather than a limited pub-
lic forum, and direct most of their legal fire at the
question of whether the exclusion of legal defense funds
from participation in the annual charity drive is "reason-
able."
As a result, the legal significance of the case is not
likely to involve a major doctrinal change in the method
of labeling different types of forums, but rather will
probably witness further elaboration of the standards to
judge the reasonableness of exclusing certain individu-
als or groups from such a nonpublic forum. In a 1983
case (Pery Education Ass'n. v. Periy Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37 (1983)), the Court narrowly ruled, 5 to 4,
that it was reasonable for a school system to allow its
internal mail system to be used by a certified teacher's
union, but not by a rival union which was trying to get
back into power. On the reasonableness point in this
case, the legal defense funds claim that the CFC has not
been limited to "traditional" charities, and that, in any
event, they are not significantly different from such
charities and theii inclusion in the fund drive is compati-
ble with its purposes. The government asserts, however,
that the CFC was intended for and must be restricted to
more "traditional" charities to avoid disruption and con-
troversy and impermissibly change the basic nature of
the campaign.
By comparison, the practical significance of the case
will be considerable in terms of the ability of a wide
range of public interest charities to solicit contributions
from the millions of federal and military employees. If
such groups do establish that it was wrong to exclude
them, they will be able to participate and attract more
funds for their worthy causes at the possible expense of
contributions to other charities. At the same time, the
government's brief contains the veiled threat that court-
ordered inclusion of such advocacy groups "ultimately
would force the President to restrict the campaign quite
substantially or, alternatively, to abolish the campaign
entirely." For a President who has frequently spoken of
the need to increase private voluntary support for basic
social welfare services, that may be a different dilemma
indeed. Ironically, the President may be spared this
difficult choice because Justice Thurgood Marshall, who
could be expected to support the legal defense funds,
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has excused himself from participating in the case. Pre-
sumably, he did so because, prior to joining the Court,
he was chief counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund-the very group challenging the
President's order.
ARGUMENTS
For Devine, Director of the Office of Personnel Management
(Counsel, Paul Blankenstein, Department ofjustice, lWashington,
DC 20530; telephone (202) 633-2217)
Limiting participation in the Combined Federal
Campaign to traditional health and welfare charities is
consistent with the First Amendment.
1. The case involves a nonpublic forum1, thus giving
government much leeway in determining access to it.
2. Limiting participation in the canpaign to traditional
charities is a reasonable regulation of that forum in
light of:
(a)the common understanding of the ptrpose of
charitable drives conducted in the workplace,
(b)the governnent's purposes in creating the fortlm1,
and
(c) the alternative channels of charitable solicitation
available to the legal defense funds.
For the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
(Counsel of Record, Charles Stephen Ralston, NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 99 Hudson Street, New
York, NY 10013; telephone (212) 219-1900)
1. The expulsion of' legal defense funds froti the CFC
violates the First Amendment.
2. Whether the CFC is a limitcd public forun or a
nonpublic forun, excluding legal defense funds is
unreasonable, since such funds are compatible with
the purposes and niethods of the canpaign.
3. The governnent's justifications for excluding such
groups-to avoid controversy, preserve neutrality
and prevent inundation of the CFC by a wide range
ofother charities-are factually or legally unsound.
4. No adequate alternative means for seeking contribu-
tion from federal employees are readily available.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of the Government
The government's position is supported by, anmong
others, the United Black Fund of America and various
local chapters or branches of the American Cancer Soci-
ety, the Anerican Red Cross, the Boy Scouts of America
and the Salvation Army, as well as certain other local
Washington, DC charities.
In Support of the NAACP
The American Civil Liberties Union, PManned Par-
enthood, the National Committee for Responsive Phi-
lanthropy, Independent Sector, the National Black
United Fund, the American Jewish Congress and the
Public Citizen Foundation.
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